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MAINTAINING THE BALANCE BETWEEN JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY IN
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW*
Edwin L. Felter, Jr.*

Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist has said that an
independent judiciary is the "crown jewel of our democracy."
However, in recent times, there have been more and more attacks on the
decisions ofjudges in specific cases, including those of administrative
law judges. Throughout the United States, campaigns have been
launched to oust judges whose decisions an interest group disliked; and,
in some cases, those campaigns have been successful.
The right to criticize judicial decisions is safeguarded by the
First Amendment, and some argue that lawyers have an obligation to
criticize the courts and judicial decisions. Roger J. Miner, a judge of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, has said, "In my
opinion, one of the most important societal duties of lawyers is the duty
to criticize the courts. It is my premise that informed criticism of the
courts and their decisions is not merely a right but an ethical obligation
imposed upon every member of the Bar."'
In a democracy, the marketplace of ideas demands an open
dialogue concerning judicial decisions. Judges should be responsive to
legitimate criticism, for example, by improving their legal scholarship,
demeanor, etc., but should not compromise their consciences in
response to public criticism. Criticism by the Bar should be done
within the parameters of the Rules of Professional Conduct, in good
faith and in good taste, and should never stoop to the level of personal
attack. A good example of legitimate criticism is Abraham Lincoln's
comment on the DredScott decision, in reply to Stephen A. Douglas'
denunciation of his questioning of the decision: "We believe as much
as Douglas in obedience to and respect for the judicial department of
Portions of this article are a reprint from THE JuDGES' JOURNAL, 22 ( Winter 1997).
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government. We think its decisions on constitutional questions, when
fully settled, should control not only the particular case decided, but the
general policy of the country, subject to be disturbed only by
amendments of the constitution, as provided in that instrument itself.
More than this would be revolution. But we think the Dred Scott
decision is erroneous. We know the court that made it has often
overruled its own decisions, and we shall do what we can to have it
overrule this. '
Yale law Professor Robert H. Gordon has noted another sort of
criticism of the judiciary: "Everybody says 'I want judges who follow
the law,'.., but what they really mean is 'I want judges who will decide
cases the way I want them decided."'3
On whatever level our dialogue with the public may be, it is
clear that the public will make itself heard, one way or another. The
legislative and executive branches of government are more directly
accountable to the voters, but judges are elected in many states, either
directly or through some form of retention vote process. In the
administrative judiciary, the job security of individual judges may to
some degree depend on who holds office in the executive branch.
Some administrative law judges have civil service or merit system
status and thereby maintain greater independence. However, they are
accountable by virtue of being subject to discipline under civil service
provisions, and they may feel the force of public opinion in other ways.
In short, nowadays, it is insufficient to maintain that judges are
only accountable to the requirement of "reasoned elaboration." Some
segments of the public from time to time disagree with that "reasoned
elaboration," and are demanding more accountability of judges.
However, the public often does not realize that many mechanisms for
accountability already exist. For example, judicial discipline
commissions now exist in most jurisdictions, and judicial performance
commissions, which monitor the performance of judges and report to

2Speech by Abraham Lincoln at Springfield, Illinois (July 17, 1858), reprinted in 2
Collected 3Works of Abraham Lincoln 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
John Gibeaut, Taking Aim, 82 A.B.A. JouR. 50, 55 (November 1996).
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the public, are becoming more and more prevalent. The administrative
judiciary is beginning to consider such mechanisms as well."
THE NEED FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AMONG ALJs
Former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny White, who
knows well how high a price can be paid for judicial independence, and
has spoken widely on judicial independence and courage, has
recognized that administrative law judges are often "unfairly perceived
as the least likely decision makers to exercise judicial independence."
Observing that the administrative judicial process touches many lives,
she emphasized that "there is no more essential place for the exercise
ofjudicial courage, for the demonstration ofjudicial independence than
in the administrative tribunals of this country where issues at the heart
of the values we hold most dear are determined." 5 (In August, 1996,
White lost a retention vote after various groups campaigned against her,
largely on the basis of her vote in a death penalty case, remanding the
case for a new sentencing hearing. See November 1996 American Bar
AssociationJournalcover article.).
The need for judicial independence in the administrative
judiciary is at least as pressing as the need for judicial independence in
the judicial branch. The administrative judiciary must deal with an
added factor. It involves accommodating legitimate agency objectives
without compromising judicial independence. Whether ALJs work
directly for agencies or are in more independent "central panels" of
ALJs, not directly under any one agency, they act on behalf of agencies.
As such, they are often expected to help achieve agency objectives.
This must, however, be done within the framework of judicial
independence. In order to ensure necessary independence, once an
agency refers a case to an independent administrative law judge, it must
totally relinquish control over the case during the adjudication phase of
4See, for example, James P. Timony, Disciplinary Proceedings Against Federal
Law Judges, 6 W. NEw ENG. L. REv. 807, 819 (1989).
Administrative
5
Speech of Former Tennessee Supreme Court Justice Penny J. White at the 1996
Annual Meeting and Conference of the National Association of Administrative Law Judges,
Nashville, Tennessee, (November 9, 1996).
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the matter (except where the agency, by statute, may legitimately limit
the scope of the referral).6
There are many ways in which both direct and subtle pressures
and influences may be exerted on administrative law judges in the
performance of their work. Some of these were considered by a panel
at the recent meeting of the National Association of Administrative
Law Judges in Nashville, Tennessee, on the subject of "Due Process,
Ex Parte Communications, and the Tension Between Independent
Decision-Making and Administrative concerns."' Justice White, along
with administrative law judges from around the country and
representatives of academia, state agencies, the Tennessee Court of the
Judiciary and Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility counsel,
addressed this subject in the context of the following issues: unwritten
agency policies, calls for consistency in ALJ decisions, ex parte
communications on "procedural" issues, requests for informal advisory
opinions, interactions with agency counsel, assistance in decisionmaking, evaluations, reductions in force, and special problems with
high-volume caseloads.
To address but one of these examples in this article, an agency
may be entitled to have deference given to its rules, but a problem
arises when unwritten or written policies outside the scope of
appropriate rule-making are involved. The fact that such policies are
generally best known in-house only, raises an issue of notice to parties
whose case may be affected by such unpromulgated policies.
Therefore, administrative law judges must resist pressure to go along
with inappropriate agency policies of which parties have no notice."
Administrative law judges have the opportunity, if not the duty,
to fulfill a very important educational function concerning judicial
independence, with agencies, agency lawyers and the public. Through
6Model Act Creating a State Central Hearing Agency, unanimously adopted by the
American Bar Association (February, 1997).
House of Delegates,
7
See infra Yoder-Hardwicke dialogue, XVII J. NAALJ at 92 (1997).
8
1t is recognized that under Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), federal interpretative rulings may be accorded deference. However
the Administrative Conference of the United States has recommended that "informal
expressions should not be accorded the same weight as definitive agency interpretations."
Transcript: Forty-second session of the Administrative Conference of the United States, 53 U.
Pitt. L. Rev. 857, 875 (1992).
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their roles as fair and neutral decision-makers, and through seminars
and other contacts, administrative law judges can demonstrate that it is
in both the agencies' and the public's long term best interest to have an
adjudication system that is independent and above reproach.
To achieve this, it is important to avoid a cozy relationship
between administrative lawjudges and agencies. Inappropriate exparte
contacts with agencies are just as taboo as inappropriate ex parte
contacts with litigants or others. Some have argued that the demands
of "agency expertise" require a close relationship between the agency
and the administrative law judge adjudicating its cases. However,
agency expertise should be presented through expert witnesses in the
context of the hearing.9
When agencies disagree with decisions of administrative law
judges, there are appropriate and inappropriate ways to proceed.
Putting pressure on the ALJs to change decisions is obviously
inappropriate. Decisions may be appealed and reviewed through the
procedures set forth in administrative procedures acts. Statutes and
rules may be amended, to address perceived problems in the law.
Agencies also need to devote the resources necessary to train its
investigative and litigation staffs, so that they can effectively present
cases before administrative law judges.
THE BEST WAY TO ACHIEVE AGENCY OBJECTIVES
The best way for an agency to achieve desired objectives is for
the agency to have high enforcement credibility in the community it
regulates. This is best done in an atmosphere where judicial
independence is not called into question. It involves thorough and
professional investigations by agency staff. It also involves skilled
agency lawyers who are thoroughly prepared; who have the ability to
play on a level playing field; who do not need special concessions from
the system; and who have the good judgment, and credibility level, to
settle the weaker cases in the best interests of the public.

9

John Hardwicke, Chief Administrative Law Judge of Maryland, The Central
Hearing Agency: Theory and Implementation in Maryland XIV J. NAALJ 5 59-67.
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To paraphrase Chief Justice Rehnquist, the "crown jewel" of an
administrative agency's credibility is a fair and impartial adjudication
mechanism that is above reproach. This mechanism is peopled by solid
and intelligent administrative law judges who have the moral fiber to
be true to their consciences and the good sense to render intelligent
decisions in conformity with the law, and support stiff who are trained
to operate by the highest ethical standards.
HOW TO ACHIEVE JUDICIAL ACCOUNTABILITY

WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
The first prerequisite to achieving judicial independence is
having an efficient system: "Justice delayed is justice denied." The
system must provide fair and intelligent case management methods,
timely hearings and timely decisions. Of no less importance to
demonstrating judicial accountability is having a quality adjudication
system that puts out quality products (decisions). In an era when
perceptions can be more compelling than reality, these two
prerequisites are indispensable.
Another important method of demonstrating accountability in
the administrative judiciary is to have an appropriate judicial
disciplinary mechanism, and a complaint handling system, that
safeguard the due process rights of both the public and accused judges.
In administrative law judge circles, one of the most
controversial issues, especially among federal administrative law
judges, involves performance evaluations of administrative law judges.
Some perceive performance evaluations as a threat to judicial
independence. In many jurisdictions, chief judges and supervisors are
obliged, by statute, to do performance evaluations of administrative law
judges. In a central panel milieu, performance evaluations should
arguably be less threatening than in a situation where the judge works
for the agency whose cases the judge adjudicates. However, problems
can arise in any performance evaluation system that ranks judges based
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on subjective criteria."0 And indeed, there are few if any truly objective
criteria on which to evaluate judges.
The danger of evaluations encroaching upon judicial
independence must be acknowledged. Evaluators must try to steer clear
of influencing outcomes in cases or categories of cases, either directly
or indirectly.
It should also be recognized that performance
evaluations, which make distinctions between the good, the not-sogood, the superb, and the better, can unintentionally and subtly foster
inappropriate judicial competition for high ratings, which can be at
odds with independent decision-making.
It is appropriate to have some form of observation and feedback,
along with a strong and ongoing training program, in order to
encourage and maintain a high performance level among ALJs.
Developmental judicial evaluation surveys (that are confidential as to
each individual judge but made public overall and/or in specific areas)
can also add a measure of credibility to the idea of accountability in the
administrative judiciary.
Judges should be disciplined when they violate appropriate
standards of competence and conduct, including Canons of Judicial
Conduct, which enjoin all judges to be free from improper influences;
to expeditiously handle their caseloads; to be fair and impartial to both
sides; and to keep abreast of current developments in the law.
Having a meaningful complaint-handling system (concerning
judges and support staff), which is tastefully publicized without
encouraging all manner of frivolous complaints, is another important
tool in demonstrating accountability. The public must know that there
is meaningful recourse for cases of inappropriate judicial conduct. The
public must be assured that its complaints are taken seriously and
handled promptly, and that complainants will be notified of the
resolution of complaints in a timely fashion.
It is also very important for the administrative judiciary to take
steps to enhance the positive image and credibility of its judges.
Sensitivity/humility training is an appropriate prescription for cases of
1OSee infra, EvaluationofAdministrative Law Judges: Premises, Means, and Ends,
by Judge Ann M. Young, for a comprehensive discussion of the issue of performance
evaluation of ALSs, XVII J. NAALJ 1 (Spring 1997).
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judicial arrogance. Judicial arrogance (a/k/a "black robe fever,"
"judgitis" or, worst of all, a "terminal case of judicial megalomania")
is a significant public frustration in the area of judicial accountability.
In these cases, perceptions overshadow, and replace, actual fact. The
judge can be fair and render an appropriate and well-reasoned decision,
but if the judge projects arrogance, one of the parties will, most likely,
walk away believing the judge was not fair.
In the case of non-central panel administrative law judges, a
well-publicized and meaningful Chinese wall must be erected between
the judges, the agency and its lawyers. Preferably, the judges should be
housed in a location different from the agency staff. The author hastens
to add that housing at a different location alone is not sufficient to
satisfy an informed observer that he or she will receive a fair and
impartial hearing by an independent judge.
Accountability in the administrative judiciary can be a tricky
proposition. How are administrative law judges accountable to the
agency? To whom are administrative law judges actually accountable?
There is one answer. Fundamentally, the administrative law judge is
accountable to the public -- in the same way that judicial branch judges
are -- to handle cases fairly, impartially and expeditiously.
Although under fire, judicial independence is more likely to be
accepted as a given in the judicial branch. In the administrative
judiciary, judicial independence is sometimes a principle that must be
fought for. It can only be maintained by educating the public and
demonstrating its value. The public will accept the judicial
independence of the administrative judiciary upon a demonstration that
its judges are accountable. It is imperative for the administrative
judiciary to craft meaningful, and ethically appropriate, accountability
measures for itself. If it does not do so, vocal segments of the
interested public may fashion inappropriate accountability measures for
the administrative judiciary.

